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Abstract 
 
 
An experiment was conducted in France to evaluate the impact of health information on 
consumers’ choice. Fish have positive and negative health attributes, and we focus on the fact 
that the amount of positive and negative attributes differ dramatically between two commonly 
consumed fish, tuna and sardines. Successive messages revealing risks (methylmercury) and 
benefits (omega-3s) of consuming fish, along with consumption recommendations, were 
delivered. Results show significant differences in reaction among participants depending on the 
order of information on risks and benefits. We combine the results of the experiment with a 
partial equilibrium model to determine the value of information. By taking into account 
adjustments of equilibrium prices for sardines and tuna, the value of health information 
computed in a partial equilibrium framework is shown to have significant positive value to 
consumers.  
 
Keywords: experimental economics, fish consumption, health information, nutrition. 
 
JEL Classification: C9, D8, I1. 
 
1. Introduction 
Public health communication programs aim at informing consumers about health benefits and 
risks associated with particular products or types of behavior. They affect consumers’ choices by 
reducing uncertainty about the “true value” of goods, thereby improving the allocative efficiency 
of their consumption behavior. Nutrition information in public health often consists in advising 
changes between imperfect substitutes, as this is the case for the advice to choose vegetable oil 
(relatively rich in non-saturated fat) rather than butter (relatively rich in saturated fat) or to eat 
white meat rather than red meat. In other words, nutrition information aims at “forcing” 
substitution between different products.  
This issue is particularly important for fish consumption since it involves a complex 
balance between benefits (with nutritional considerations) and risks (with toxicological 
considerations). Recently, several health agencies around the world issued messages regarding 
fish consumption. As there are large differences among fish species regarding their health-
promoting content, knowledge about consumers’ tendency to substitute different fish species for 
each other after revelation of information is essential for designing efficient health 
communication. As the US National Academies recently mentioned (National Academies, 2006, 
p.12) “Research is needed to develop and evaluate more effective communication tools for use 
when conveying the health benefits and risks of seafood consumption (…)” 
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the impact of health information on consumers’ 
choice between a relatively “risky” type of fish (i.e., tuna) and a type of fish that is not only “less 
risky” but in addition offers health benefits (i.e., sardine). The risk and the benefit considered in 
this paper are, respectively, methylmercury and omega-3 fatty acids. For this, an experiment was 
conducted in France with women of childbearing age, since fish is particularly important during 
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pregnancy. The women were endowed with a given quantity of “healthy” or “risky” fish and they 
were asked their willingness to exchange this endowment against a varying quantity of the other 
fish.1 This experimental procedure allowed us to evaluate the substitution between products. 
Messages successively revealing risks and benefits were delivered, along with consumption 
recommendations. 
First, results show significant differences of reaction among participants depending on 
the order of information on risks and benefits. When the risks are revealed before the benefits, 
only the risks information significantly modifies choice. Conversely, when benefits are revealed 
before the risks, both benefits and risks revelations significantly modify choices. 
Second, we propose a new methodology that combines the results of this experiment with 
a partial equilibrium model for determining the value of information. Our experimental data are 
introduced into a calibrated model replicating observed data in a benchmark year. Simulating the 
impact of information on the market for sardines and tuna allows measuring the effects of 
demand variation on equilibrium prices. Surplus variations coming from the information 
revelation determine the value of information. As information entails price modifications via 
demand shifts, it is shown that the estimated value of information is positive but lower than a 
value of information estimated with constant prices. Consumers not belonging to the group at 
risk and not concerned by the information will also be affected by price variation. 
The contributions of this paper are both empirical and methodological. First, from an 
empirical point of view, our paper differs from previous studies measuring the effect of 
                                                 
1 This approach for measuring substitution is based on Masters and Sanogo (2002) and Sanogo and Masters (2002), 
focusing on a single endowment point (see also Binswanger, 1980). They, however, used only one type of product 
for the initial endowment. MacCrimmon and Toda (1969) were among the first in the experimental determination of 
indifference curves. Their experiments proceed by consecutive choices between two consumption bundles in order 
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information in experiments. For instance, Hayes et al. (1995), Fox et al. (2002), Noussair et al. 
(2002) or Wansink et al. (2004) combine positive and/or negative (or shorter and/or longer) 
information, for measuring the relative impact of these different options on the buyers’ 
willingness to pay (WTP). Our results differ, since these authors revealed positive and negative 
messages on the same question issued by different actors in the information environment, while 
we consider different sequences in the revelation of a similar set of information. In our paper, 
there is no countervailing effect, and we show that the order of benefit and risk messages has 
implications regarding their efficacy in changing consumption behavior.  
Second, our paper provides a new methodology to combine data from economic 
experiments with a partial market equilibrium calibrating the French market to obtain an estimate 
of the value of information (given by agents’ surplus variations). In the calibrated model, the 
aggregate responses coming from the experiment are integrated by taking into the average values 
over the subjects. Whereas other papers, e.g., Huffman et al. (2003 and 2007) and Rousu et al. 
(2004, 2007), do not acknowledge the equilibrium price variations in response to health-related 
information, our paper completes the analysis by introducing equilibrium price variation. The 
results provide insights about distributional effects associated with health information over 
consumers “at risk” and concerned by the revealed information, and also consumers who are not 
directly concerned by the information but affected by resulting price modifications. This 
methodology provides new insights about the way to extrapolate results gained in the lab “to the 
world beyond” (see Levitt and List, 2007, p.1). 
                                                                                                                                                             
to evaluate rates of substitution for varying endowments. This was considered too demanding on subjects when 
testing at the same time the successive revelation of information to consumers.  
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The paper continues with a brief presentation of risks and benefits of fish consumption. 
In the following sections, we describe the experiment and discuss the results. The paper 
concludes with a discussion of the implications for public health policy. 
 
2. Fish consumption, health benefits/risks, and regulatory decisions 
Safety and nutrition linked to fish consumption have become an increasing public health concern 
in recent years. In particular, methylmercury, an organic form of mercury, is a toxic compound 
that alters fetal brain development when there is significant prenatal exposure (EFSA, 2004). 
Children of women who consume large amounts of fish during pregnancy are particularly 
vulnerable to the adverse neurological effects of methylmercury (Budtz-Jorgensen et al., 2002). 
A high level of methylmercury is concentrated in long-lived, predatory fish, such as tuna, shark, 
and swordfish (Mahaffey et al., 2004). 
The regulatory choice of how to manage this risk is complex since the nutrients in fish are 
also essential to the health of a developing fetus. More precisely, omega-3 polyunsaturated fatty 
acids, along with iodine, selenium, and phosphorus, confer benefits to the fetus such as infant 
cognition and improvement in cardiovascular health. According to the European Food Safety 
Agency (EFSA, 2005, p. 1), “Fatty fish is an important source of long chain n-3 polyunsaturated 
fatty acids (LC n-3 PUFA)…. There is evidence that fish consumption, especially of fatty fish 
(one to two servings a week), benefits the cardiovascular system and is suitable for secondary 
prevention in manifest coronary heart disease. There may also be benefits in fetal development, 
but an optimal intake has not been established.” In addition, there is still a lot of uncertainty and 
controversy about whether these benefits may outweigh the harm from mercury exposure. 
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Several countries have decided to broadcast specific advisories, including the US 
beginning in 2001, Canada in 2002, the UK in 2003, and Ireland, Australia, and New Zealand in 
2004. The responsible health or food agencies of these countries have given an advisory that 
vulnerable groups (small children, pregnant women, and women of childbearing age) should 
consume fish while avoiding species at the high end of the food chain such as shark, swordfish, 
king mackerel, tilefish, and tuna because of high levels of mercury contamination (EFSA, 2004). 
The use of this advisory is of interest, as it mitigates the broad applicability of the general 
recommendation by nutrition and health experts to consume fish (in general without further 
qualification) twice or three times a week. This latter recommendation is motivated through the 
health benefit of a sufficient consumption of omega-3 fatty acids, a level that is considered to 
dramatically lower the risk of heart disease in adults.  
Since 2001, the US has been active in disseminating the information for childbearing and 
pregnant women by using mass media or brochures distributed by gynecologists and 
obstetricians (EPA, 2004). The 2004 US advisory begins by explicitly mentioning the benefits of 
regular fish consumption because of the content of omega-3 polyunsaturated fatty acids.2 The 
2001 US advisory was found to have its intended effect, as pregnant women reduced their 
consumption of fish (Oken et al., 2003). However, the US advisory raised some criticisms by 
doctors (e.g., Drs. Hibbeln and Golding), who argued in favor of the large benefits of omega-3 
fatty acids for fetuses (The Economist, 2006b). According to The Economist (2006a, p. 14), “the 
                                                 
2 The advisory then stipulates that some fish species should be avoided, such as shark, swordfish, king mackerel, and 
tilefish. It also advises consumption of up to two average meals of fish per week that are “lower in mercury,” such as 
shrimp, canned light tuna, salmon, pollock, and catfish, and limiting to only one meal per week the consumption of 
“albacore” (white) tuna because of a larger concentration of methylmercury compared to canned light tuna. Note 
that bluefin tuna (used for steak, sashimi, or sushi) is not mentioned in the US advisory despite an average content in 
methylmercury similar to the one for swordfish and king mackerel (banned by the advisory). According to Knecht 
(2006, p. P6), “Tuna, perhaps the most popular sushi fish, may contain high levels of mercury. ‘A lot of people think 
sushi is a health food, but it isn’t if you eat tuna sushi twice a week,’ says Eli Saddler, a public health analyst with 
Gotmercury.org, an environmental advocacy group.” 
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researchers note that American guidelines recommending that pregnant women should not eat 
fish because it may contain mercury have the perverse effect of cutting off those women (and 
their fetuses) from one of the best sources of omega-3s.” 
The content and the details of the advisories vary among countries because of 
idiosyncratic characteristics regarding the patterns of fish consumption and the type of fish 
commonly caught. There are substantial differences regarding both sequence of information 
revelation and species mentioned in warnings. All the messages explicitly mention the benefits 
of fish consumption, while they differ about the details linked to the benefits, since omega-3s 
and fatty fish rich in omega-3 are not always mentioned. The US and Australia/ New Zealand 
mention the benefits at the beginning of their advisories, while the other countries mention these 
benefits at the end of their advisories. Our experiment is useful to assess the effect of different 
sequences of revelation.  
The French situation is interesting because no major diffusion of information has been 
decided upon yet.3 Some warnings have been posted on the website of the Agence Française de 
Sécurité Sanitaire des Aliments, the French food safety agency (AFSSA, 2002 and 2004). 
However, despite few articles in the popular press (see, for instance, Miserey, 2003), no major 
broadcasting of information via obstetricians, maternity hospitals, or booklets was implemented 
by the sanitary authorities. This absence of national informative campaigns suggests that in 
France very few childbearing women are informed regarding the potential risk of methylmercury 
exposure. In contrast to the methylmercury issue, information on omega-3 fatty acids is 
                                                 
3 One year after the experiment reported in this paper, the French food safety agency (AFSSA) issued a press release 
on methylmercury (AFSSA, 2006) that led to a few articles in the popular press. Tuna, in particular, is not 
mentioned in this press release. To the best of our knowledge, no major dissemination of information via 
obstetricians, maternity hospitals, or booklets is actually planned in France. 
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relatively widespread in France by mass media or advertising campaigns.4  
This allows us to measure the effect in the laboratory under controlled circumstances. A 
similar procedure would not be possible in the US because of widespread broadcasts of the 
mercury message in 2002 and 2004. Because of the potential costs to society from inefficient 
regulation, the following experiment was designed to give evidence on which to base 
communication by taking into account the consumers’ reaction regarding two different fish 
species. We particularly focus on different sequences of information. 
 
3. The experiment 
The previous discussion suggests the choice of some relevant variables for the experiment in 
order to fit real situations and thus help the public decision maker. We will successively detail 
the sample, the choice of products, the revealed information, and the experiment.  
 
3.1 The sample 
As pregnancy and breastfeeding status or being a young child are crucial indications for the risks 
linked to methylmercury, we focus on women of childbearing age, namely, women between 18 
and 45 years old. We conducted the experiment in Dijon, the main city of Burgundy in France, in 
multiple sessions in January 2006. A sample of 115 women was randomly selected based on the 
quota method and is representative for age groups and socio-economic status for the population 
of the city. Women were contacted by phone. They were informed that they had to accept to eat 
                                                 
4 For instance, the brand “Connétable” launched an advertising campaign about canned sardines (used in this 
experiment) and the benefit coming from omega-3s. From April to June 2005, this advertising was published in two 
national health magazines, five national women’s magazines, six cooking magazines, and three TV magazines. See 
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both tuna and sardines during the experiment. Once they agreed to attend the session, they 
received a formal invitation letter and a reminder call a few hours before the experimental 
session. We used the INRA (Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique) sensory laboratory 
with kitchen facilities and computers for collecting subjects’ responses. Each experimental 
session lasted one hour and included between 4 and 12 women. 
 
3.2 The products 
Tuna and sardines were selected as products (i) because they are frequently consumed in France 
and (ii) because their nutritional content is significantly different.  
(i) This experiment focused on canned fish, known and consumed by almost all French 
consumers. Canned tuna and canned sardine are commonly consumed types of canned fish in 
France. The quantities consumed, however, are quite different, since 65% of canned fish 
consumed in France is tuna and 11% sardines (Ofimer, 2003). There is an asymmetry in 
consumption habits with an “a priori preference” for tuna, while the nutritional considerations 
revealed in the messages favor sardine consumption. As often the case, the nutrition information 
in this advisory aims at shifting consumption between imperfect substitutes. 
The choice of the specific cans within tuna and sardines was mainly imposed by the 
available products on French grocery shelves at the end of 2005. As we are interested in 
estimating the substitution between two imperfect substitutes (namely, two types of canned fish), 
we aimed for similarity in the maximum number of elements for the experiment, namely, the 
same brand, sauce, weight, packaging, and almost the same price. This requirement allows us to 
                                                                                                                                                             
http://www.connetable.com/ communication/index.asp (accessed February 2006). 
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isolate the substitution between the two different types of canned fish and the impact of 
information on consumers’ choices.  
We selected two cans of the French brand “Connétable” that satisfied numerous common 
criteria. Table 1 shows that the weights and the prices from the selected cans were very close.5 
The closeness in weight and price allows a direct comparison of the products by participants in 
the experiment. However, the price per kilogram was significantly larger than the average price 
in France, which suggests that we selected high-quality products (see table 1).  
(ii) The other reason for the selection of tuna and sardines was the considerable difference 
in the contents of mercury and omega-3, as shown in table 2. Tuna contains high mercury and 
low omega-3 levels, whereas sardines contain high omega-3s (the highest levels in fish; see 
Sidhu 2003, table 5, p. 341) and low mercury levels. It should be noted, however, that data from 
different sources in the literature can show large variations because of the inherent variability in 
concentrations of samples as a function of species, age, and size, which are difficult to reflect in 
controlled sampling plans.6 This explains the two figures proposed for omega-3 in canned tuna in 
table 2.  
The contrasted contents in mercury and omega-3s have important consequences for 
information revealed during the experiment. We now turn to a description of the revealed 
messages. 
 
                                                 
5 Details can be found on http://www.connetable.com/nos_produits/detail.asp?pid=35 (accessed February 2007) for 
tuna and http://www.connetable.com/nos_produits/detail.asp?pid=1 (accessed February 2007) for sardines. The only 
difference regarding the presentation was in the shape of the can. Note that for this experiment we used the 87g can 
for sardines that was replaced by the 115g can in January 2006. 
6 Canned tuna encompasses a variety of fish species, namely, the Skipjack, the Yellowfin, and the Albacore. 
According to EFSA (2005, table 8, p. 19) the average methylmercury content is 0.15 for the Skipjack, 0.3 for the 
Yellowfin, and 0.49 for the Albacore.  
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3.3 The revealed health information 
During the experiment, different types of information about risk and benefits were 
communicated. We restricted our attention to one benefit, namely, omega-3 fatty acids, and one 
risk, namely, methylmercury.7 The messages were inspired by elements coming from health 
agencies in different countries as described in the previous section.  
While the complete information revealed to subjects is given in appendix A, it is possible 
to sum up the types of information delivered at different times as follows:  
(1a) Information about the existence of omega-3 fatty acids with the ratio of omega-3s in 
sardines to omega-3s in tuna equal to 6. 
(1b) Explanations about the health benefit coming from omega-3 fatty acids and 
recommendation regarding the weekly consumption of fish. 
(2a) Information revealed about the existence of methylmercury with the ratio of 
methylmercury in tuna to methylmercury in sardines equal to 4. 
(2b) Explanations about the health risk coming from methylmercury and 
recommendation for avoiding tuna. 
We detailed ratios quantifying the relative content of nutrients and contaminants based on 
table 2, which is unusual compared to current public health advisories. This choice provides 
scientific credibility in our context and fits the restricted choice between only two types of fish in 
the experiment. We were conservative in the choice of the values of the ratio, which means that 
                                                 
7 For simplicity, we abstract from communication on other risks of dioxins and PCBs or specific communication on 
other benefits coming from iodine or selenium in fish. 
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we took the values leading to the lowest differences in content between both types of fish.8 In 
particular, we took the values given by Sidhu (2003) for omega-3s, namely, 0.5g and 3.3g in 
table 2.  
For information (1) and (2), we separate the information regarding the nutrient and 
hazard content in fish ((1a) and (2a), respectively) from the description of the health effect and 
the consumption recommendation ((1b) and (2b), respectively). This split allows us to measure 
consumers’ ability to interpret “raw” information ((1a) and (2a)) and to modify their purchasing 
decisions after recommendations ((1b) and (2b)). These recommendations were simplified in 
order to avoid confusion and the need to provide additional information about species. This 
explains why we mention the advisory to eat fish twice a week in (1b), while some 
recommendations mention the fatty fish (salmon, sardines, or mackerel), and why we maintain 
the advisory to avoid eating tuna in (2b), without differentiating among tuna species, such as the 
Albacore mentioned in the US advisory (EPA, 2004). 
 
3.4 The experimental procedure 
During the choice procedure, women were asked to choose between an endowment of six cans of 
Fish I and a variable number of cans of Fish II, varying from 1 to 12. We endowed participants 
with either six cans of tuna (groups A and B) or six cans of sardines (groups C and D). Different 
endowments are essential for obtaining complete information about substitution and for 
                                                 
8 For the ratio of methylmercury, we did not consider the Albacore value (equal to 0.49 mg) that would be the 
specific level of the can used for this experiment. Our aim is to focus on tuna without detailing the species (which 
differs from the EPA, 2004). This choice is justified by the partial existence of labels mentioning species on tuna 
cans in France, so that communication on species would be shaky. Therefore, the mention of “canned light tuna” in 
advisories such as in the US (see EPA, 2004) is not possible in France. 
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determining welfare changes in section 5. We started with a relatively large number of cans (6) 
since cans of fish are a highly storable product (up to five years). 
The experiment was divided into several stages.9  
(1)  Participating women read some general instructions and signed a form stipulating 
that they accept and will follow the rules of the experiment.  
(2)  They filled in a computer-assisted questionnaire on health and nutrition behavior and 
socio-demographic characteristics.  
(3)  They had one minute to examine cans of both tuna and sardines. Then the can price 
of the endowed Fish I was posted on the computer screen and participants were 
asked to give an estimation of the retail price of a can of Fish II. 
(4)  They had two minutes to taste both kinds of fish.  
(5)  The choice procedure was explained and the choice experiment was conducted for 
the following stages 
 (i)  without health information;  
 (ii)  after receiving message (1a) in groups A and C or (2a) in groups B and D; 
 (iii)  after receiving message (1b) in groups A and C or (2b) in groups B and D; 
 (iv)  after receiving message (2a) in groups A and C or (1a) in groups B and D; 
 (v)  after receiving message (2b) in groups A and C or (1b) in groups B and D. 
(6)  Participants replied to a short questionnaire on their understanding of information 
received and choices made.  
 13
(7)  The experiment concluded by randomly selecting the products to be remitted to 
participants based on the selected choices. Participants also received €10 of 
indemnity and a brochure explaining the risks linked to methylmercury.  
The choice procedure (5) was divided into five stages. In each stage, participants had to 
indicate their choices in 12 different situations. The 12 choice situations were presented on a 
single sheet of paper (see appendix B). The number of cans of Fish II varied from 1 to 12, each 
corresponding to one situation. For each line corresponding to one situation, participants had to 
choose either the six cans of Fish I or the indicated number of cans of Fish II. To avoid satiation 
effects, only one choice situation was selected randomly (at stage (7) of the experiment) among a 
total of 60 choices made during the five stages. Each woman then received the number of cans of 
Fish I or Fish II she preferred in this choice situation selected at random. This procedure is 
preference revealing, because each choice situation has a positive probability of being selected.  
Before starting, the choice mechanism was explained and illustrated in a trial round.10 
After this warm-up round, women were asked in the first stage to make their definitive choices 
for the 12 situations without any health information. These choices represent an evaluation of 
preferences after product tasting and before revelation of health information.  
For the following stages, information was successively revealed on the computer screen. 
Each message was posted for at least 30 seconds before participants could proceed to the 
following instructions. Each time, the speaker invited the women to carefully read the message 
                                                                                                                                                             
9 No communication between subjects was allowed during the choice process. 
10 The explanation was read by the organizer before choices were made for all 12 situations. We recalled the price of 
Fish I and the value of endowment of six cans (namely, €9.90 for six cans of tuna or €10.14 for six cans of sardines). 
We included this training and explanatory phase to make the choice-revealing mechanism more transparent. From 
these 12 training choices, we simulated some random choices among the 12 choices as an example to facilitate their 
understanding that each choice could determine what they would actually take home. Participants were allowed to 
ask questions. 
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before making new choices regarding the substitution between Fish I and Fish II. When new 
information was provided, the previous message was maintained in grey, while the new message 
appeared in blue. We conducted the experiment in four treatments, varying the fish species in the 
initial endowment (tuna or sardine) and changing the order of information about the risk of 
methylmercury (2a) and (2b) before the information about benefits of omega-3 fatty acids (1a) 
and (1b) and vice versa. Table 3 describes the experimental design and the number of attendants. 
 
3.5 The interpretation of results 
The idea developed by Binswanger (1980) and Masters and Sanogo (2002) is to use respondents’ 
choices to infer their relative preference and WTP. This procedure is simpler than the Vickrey 
(1961) auction mechanism and it focuses on the relative value of a good relative to another 
product. Based on product substitution, this methodology is particularly tailored to our empirical 
question searching for details regarding the consumption of fish species. The number of cans of 
Fish II at which the consumer switches from six cans of Fish I to Fish II can be interpreted as the 
point at which the consumer reveals indifference (Sanogo and Masters, 2002, p. 257). In contrast 
to their approach that estimates WTP for almost perfect substitutes that differ only in their 
information content, we are interested in estimating the substitution between two imperfect 
substitutes because of nutrition considerations. Tuna and sardines differ not only in the 
risk/benefit dimension but also in other preference dimensions such as taste. 
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In this experiment, the consumer owns a given quantity of 6=Iq  cans of fish I.11 The 
experiment provides the selected quantities of Fish II, IIq . The consumer being indifferent 
between the two product bundles is denoted as 
III q~q .          (1) 
Based on the 12 observed choices at stage j with j∈{i, ii, …, v} (see section 3.4), the experiment 
allows us to isolate the quantity jIIq~  for which 
j
I
j
II qq~ ≺1−  and jIjII qq~ ; .  We use this quantity at 
which subjects switch to define the switching ratio. The implicit switching ratio (SWR) for the 
good II in terms of the price of good I is  
j
6j
II j
II
SWR
q
= ,         (2) 
where j∈{i, …, v} denotes the five stages of choices under the different contexts of information 
(see the previous section 3.4). 
Equation (2) is an estimation of preferences for good II (relative to good I). An increasing 
switching ratio jIISWR  (namely decreasing j
j
IIq ) during the experiment implies increasing 
preference for good II relative to good I, since a lower number of cans of good II is preferred to 6 
cans of good I.  
This framework can be adapted to reveal relative WTP. As the observed can price l Ip  of 
the endowed Fish I was posted on the computer screen before subject choices (see point (3) in 
previous subsection 3.4), it is possible to determine the unknown WTP denoted by jIIwtp  for fish 
                                                 
11 As the weight of the cans are almost similar (see table 1), we abstract from the slight quantity difference. 
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II at stage j. From the previous paragraph, it follows that ( ) l1j j jII II I Iwtp q p q− <  and 
l.j j jII II I Iwtp q p q≥ . Rewriting the previous inequalities leads to12 
l
6 6
1
j
II
j j
II III
wtp
q qp
≤ < −  .         (3) 
Equation (3) implies that equation (2) approximates the ratio between the WTP for good II, jIIp , 
and the WTP for good I, Ip , with 
l
j
j II
II
I
wtpSWR
p
≈ .         (4) 
In other words, the switching ratio approximates the WTP of good II relative to the revealed 
market price of good I. This relative WTP is an average WTP, as we do not derive it for a 
marginal change in demand but for a discrete change in demand. Because of this and under the 
assumption of WTP to be decreasing with demand, one would expect that WTP at the margin is 
overestimated.13 
If during the experiment every IIq { }121 ...,,∈  only satisfies jIjII qq ;  (only cans of Fish II 
were selected for situations 1 to 12), we arbitrarily determined a value 1=jIIq~ . If during the 
                                                 
12 Note that, although at stage (3) of the experiment, we announced the actual market price of fish I, Ipˆ , and the 
value of their endowment, this step is not necessary for the results that follow. Instead of using Ipˆ  as in Masters 
and Sanogo (2002), it would be possible to use the unknown WTP for fish I, Iwtp . In stage (3), subjects also gave 
their estimation of the retail price of a can of Fish II. The estimates are on average very close to the observed retail 
prices detailed in table 1. Indeed, the average price for sardines estimated by groups A and B was 1.55€ (retail price 
1.69€). The average price for tuna estimated by groups C and D was 1.59€ (retail price 1.66€).  
13 This type of average WTP evaluation is difficult to avoid in experimental economics or contingent choice studies. 
The size of the good is often changed in discrete steps of significant size to make sure that sufficient stakes are 
involved for the participants to go through the effort of the valuation exercise. Hence, properly speaking we are 
evaluating average WTP for the number of cans involved. To avoid this issue in this choice experimental framework 
it would be necessary to recur to MacCrimmon and Toda’s (1969) methodology, which seemed too demanding on 
the subjects when information is revealed during the choice procedure (see footnote 1).  
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experiment no j jIIq { }121 ...,,∈  is observed for a respondent, we arbitrarily determined a value 
j j
IIq =13. Based on this convention, [ ]6 /13, 6jIISWR ∈ . Extreme points (namely, boundary 
choices j jIIq =1 or j
j
IIq =13) may lead to an under- or overestimation of the substitution between 
products. Despite this limitation, the methodology is useful for providing information regarding 
the consumers’ substitution for fish that varies in nutrient and hazard components and the effect 
of information on relative preferences. 
 
4. Experimental results 
From respondents’ choices, we computed the switching ratio jIISWR  for products at the different 
information stages regarding the revelation of information. Based on equation (2), figure 1 
presents the average switching ratio jIISWR  by group for all respondents at the successive stages 
of information revelation (on the X axis). Recall that in groups A and B (C and D), consumers 
were initially endowed with six cans of tuna (sardines).  
The first bar for every group in figure 1 indicates participants’ iIISWR  after tasting both 
products and without health information (initial stage i). The iIISWR  for sardines by groups A 
and B is lower than the iIISWR  for tuna by groups C and D. This means that women attending 
the experimental sessions had a higher initial preference for tuna, which is consistent with 
product shares observed in the French market. Table 4 also shows that there is a stronger 
preference for tuna than for sardines. Many more people constantly choose tuna, no matter how 
large the number of cans of sardines they can receive (10 subjects in group A and B combined), 
or how small the number of cans of tuna they receive (4 subjects in Group C and D). 
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The revelation of information leads to several interesting results in figure 1. First, the 
information leads to an increase in SWR for groups A and B and a decrease in SWR for groups 
C and D, a result that implies that health information matters to the women. We tested for the 
significance of these differences using the Wilcoxon test for paired samples. Those differences 
that were significant at the 5% level are identified in figure 1 using a Δ* at the change of 
information. We repeated the same tests while excluding the extreme observations defined by 
1IIq =  and 13IIq =  (see footnotes a and b in Figure 1). 
The overall effect of the information linked to the complete revelation of the four 
consecutive messages (the difference between the fifth bar and the first bar in each figure) has a 
larger effect on the variation of SWR for sardines than on the variation of SWR for tuna. Indeed 
the average SWR for the sardines increases by 1.01 in group A (the difference between the fifth 
bar and the first bar), while the average SWR for tuna decreases from 0.68 in group C (the order 
of information was the same for both groups). Moreover, the SWR for the sardines increases by 
0.54 in group B, while the SWR for tuna decreases from 0.40 in group D. These numbers 
indicate that the effect of information is not symmetric in the initial endowment.14 The change in 
SWR for sardines is larger, namely when consumers are initially endowed with tuna.15 
Second, the order (equivalent to some extent to the emphasis) of the messages is crucial. 
It turns out that the information about mercury (message 2a) leads to a significant change in 
                                                 
14 The literature showed that an endowment effect exists if consumers prefer to keep their endowed good 
(Kahneman et al., 1990) and if goods are not close substitutes (Haneman, 1991, and Shogren et al., 1994). 
15 We conducted a 2-Sided Mann-Whitney-U-Test on the hypothesis that SWR of groups A and B and groups C and 
D come from the same distribution. It yields a test statistic of 589.500 (p-value 0.000), which means that the H0  of 
both samples coming from the same distribution is rejected at the 1% significance level. For comparing groups A 
and B and groups C and D, we used the switching ratio defined according to equation (2). The switching-point 
quantities are, respectively, [6 /13,6]sardinesSWR ∈  for groups A and B and k 1/sardines tunaSWR SWR=  with 
k [1/ 6,13/ 6]sardinesSWR ∈ for groups C and D. Only the points between 6/13 and 13/6 were considered for computing 
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SWR whatever the order. If we consider the difference between the fifth bar and the first bar, the 
SWR increase for sardines is larger by 0.47 in group A compared to group B and the SWR 
decrease for tuna is larger by 0.28 in group C compared to group D. In particular, if messages 
(2a) and (2b) on methylmercury precede messages (1a) and (1b) on omega-3s (for groups B and 
D), then the major shift in the SWR is coming from the information on methylmercury. In other 
words, the information on omega-3s does no longer cause subsequent change in substitution.  
Information on omega-3s only changed SWR significantly if it came before information 
about mercury (for groups A and C). If messages (1a) and (1b) on omega-3s precede messages 
(2a) and (2b) on methylmercury, the information on omega-3s does have an effect on the SWR. 
Nevertheless, the information about methylmercury still has a larger impact on the SWR than the 
information about omega-3s (see group A). Including extreme observations (with 1IIq =  and 
13IIq = ) matters to explain significance of additional information on the SWR shifts denoted by 
Δ*a in groups A and C. Indeed, extreme points are mainly coming from subjects initially not 
interested in sardines with k 13iSardq =  inside group A and k 1itunaq =  inside group C at stage i.16 
Third, the explanation of the health effect and the corresponding recommendation at the 
second round of information and revealed in messages (1b) or (2b) (third bar in figure 1) matters 
since the SWR shifts compared to the first rounds of information in messages (1a) and (2a) 
                                                                                                                                                             
the 2-Sided Mann-Whitney-U-Test. This led us to consider 45 observations for groups A and B and 56 observations 
for groups C and D. 
16 The difference between the average SWR after and before information (equivalent of fifth bar and the first-bar in 
figure 1) for the entire subgroup with k 13iSardq =  or k 1itunaq =  is larger in absolute value than the difference for 
the other subjects with j2 12iIIq≤ ≤ . 60% of subjects initially not interested by sardines with k 13iSardq =  inside 
groups A and B switched towards sardines after the revelation of information with k 12jSardq ≤  for j i≠ . 45% of 
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detailing only the relative content in the nutrient/contaminant (the second bar) matter in groups 
A, C and D (see note b in figure 1). The effect is only significant the end of the experiment (stage 
(v), fifth bar) in group A. This result suggests that information satiation is easily achieved (see 
also Wansink et al., 2004). This result is also apparent in table 4, which shows the number of 
subjects who change their switching ratio after receiving a message.  
Since the information significantly influences the SWR, we now turn to the impact of 
information on the agents’ surplus for determining the value of information. 
 
5. Welfare analysis for estimating the value of information 
We now turn to a welfare analysis estimating the value of information from switching ratios 
defined in equation (2) and presented in figure 1. For simplicity, we only consider the 
information impact after the complete revelation of the messages at the last stage j=v, which 
allows us to pool groups A and B and groups C and D, respectively. 
Following Foster and Just (1989) and Teisl et al. (2001), information is welfare 
enhancing if consumers change their consumption behavior. Conversely, if consumers’ 
purchases do not change, information has no value. Thus, the value of information is estimated 
by the difference in agents’ surplus between the situation with a complete revelation of health 
information at stage j=v and the situation without health information at j=i. As we focus on 
choices between imperfect substitutes, the surplus comparison needs to take into account 
imperfect substitution between the two goods. In this context, a consumer may continue to 
                                                                                                                                                             
subjects initially not interested by sardines with k 1itunaq =  inside groups C and D switched towards sardines after 
the revelation of information with k 2jtunaq ≥  for j i≠ . 
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purchase both tuna and sardines after the revelation of information, even if she reduces her tuna 
purchases and increases her sardine purchases. This point differs from the methodology used by 
Huffman et al. (2003 and 2007) and Rousu et al. (2004 and 2007) since they assume that a 
consumer purchases only one type of product.  
One way to consider imperfect substitution consists in combining switching ratios 
coming from the experiment with a calibrated partial equilibrium model measuring imperfect 
substitution between sardines and tuna and being able to replicate prices and quantities in the 
French market. This calibration allows us to evaluate the market price modification and shifts in 
agents’ surplus that would arise in response to the information revelation.  
 
5.1. The model 
The switching ratio jIISWR  for fish II relatively to fish I at stage j is an indicator of 
preferences for fish II. By using (4), a relative measure of the impact of information on 
preferences for product II is given by 
v i v i
II II II II
II i i
II II
SWR SWR wtp wtp
SWR wtp
δ − −=  ,      (5) 
where the complete revelation of health information is defined by stage j=v and the situation 
without health information is defined by j=i.17 Thus, IIδ  represent the relative change in the per-
unit willingness to pay for fish II coming from health information. This measure isolates the 
effect of health information, abstracted from any quality/quantity effects linked to the products I 
and II. A positive value of IIδ  means an increase in the willingness to pay for fish II. The 
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experiment with groups A and B gives us relative changes in the willingness to pay for sardines, 
Sδ , and the experiment with group C and D gives us the relative changes in the willingness to 
pay for tuna, Tδ . These values may be used in the following model. 
Demand and supply are considered as linear (as in Lichtenberg et al. (1998) and 
Sobolevsky et al. (2005)). We combined Spence’s (1976) quasilinear utility function with the 
approach by Polinsky and Rogerson (1983) for the treatment of the health information in a 
demand function. Spence’s (1976) specification of the utility function of imperfect substitutes is 
consistent with the assumption of separability of the two goods in question from all other goods 
that drives our experiment (see section 3.5).18 The utility function of a consumer k={1,…,K} 
concerned by the revealed information is: 
2 2( , , ) / 2 / 2 ( )k tk sk k t tk t tk s sk s sk tk sk j tk tk sk sk kU x x v x x x x x x I r x h x wα β α β γ= − + − − + − + + ,   (6) 
subject to , 0tk tkx x ≥  and where kw  is the numeraire good. 2 / 2t tk t tkx xα β−  ( 2 / 2s sk s skx xα β− ) is 
the immediate satisfaction from consuming a quantity tkx  of tuna ( skx  of sardines). The 
parameter γ  describes the degree of substituability between the two products with 
[ , ]t sMinγ β β<  for concavity. The parameter Ij represents the information context. At stage j=i 
no information has been revealed and Ii=0.  Iv=1 means that the subject received complete 
information at stage j=v. The perceived risk (perceived health benefit) for consumer k associated 
with the consumption of tuna (sardine) is denoted by tk tkr x−  ( sk skh x ). Thus, the utility weight 
per-unit risk is tkr−  and per-unit health benefit skh . 
The maximization of (6) under the budget constraint, t tk s sk k kp x p x v y+ + = , where ky  
                                                                                                                                                             
17 One extension could also consider the value of information at stages ii, iii or iv. 
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denotes the income of person k, leads to the following inverse demand function for tuna and 
sardines 
.
.
t t t tk sk j tk
s s s sk tk j sk
p x x I r
p x x I h
α β γ
α β γ
⎧ = − − −⎪⎨ = − − +⎪⎩
.       (7) 
Note that a higher risk reduces the demand for tuna while a higher health benefit leads to a 
demand increase for sardines. Graphically speaking, the demand curve for tuna shifts 
downwards, whereas the demand curve for sardines shifts upwards. We consider both these 
shifts in the estimation of welfare change. By inverting (7), we obtain consumer k’s demand for 
tuna and sardines: 
2
2
( )
( )
t s s s t s j s tk sk
tk
s t
s t t t s t j tk t sk
sk
s t
p p I r h
x
p p I r h
x
α β α γ β γ β γ
β β γ
α β α γ β γ γ β
β β γ
⎧ − − + − +=⎪ −⎪⎨ − − + + +⎪ =⎪ −⎩
.     (8) 
Aggregated market demand for tuna and sardines are given by 
1
K
t tkk
X x== ∑  and 1Ks skkX x== ∑ . 
Inverting these aggregated demands leads to the inverse demand functions 
1
1
.
.
K
tkj t k
t t t s j
K
skj s k
s s s t j
r
p X X I
K K K
h
p X X I
K K K
β γα
β γα
=
=
⎧⎪ = − − −⎪⎨⎪ = − − +⎪⎩
∑
∑ .      (9) 
Using (9), the difference between aggregate inverse demands at period (v) and (i) is given by  
1
/Kv it t tkkp p r K=− = −∑  for tuna and to 1 /Kv is s skkp p h K=− = ∑  for sardines.  
For any subgroup z linked to the experiment, we will calibrate demands (without 
                                                                                                                                                             
18 In particular, this specification omits the revenue effect. 
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information revelation) in correspondence to the proportion that the subgroup represents in the 
French population. Then, for a subgroup z and by using (5), it is possible to use the average 
change in willingness to pay for sardines, 
z
Sδ , over subjects in group A and B, and the average 
change in willingness to pay for tuna, 
z
Tδ , over subject in group C and D. By using the previous 
definition of v it tp p−  and v is sp p− , the average value of per-unit risks and per-unit benefits for 
the subgroup z are  
1
1
/
/
Z
Z
z zK i
t Ttk Z tk
z zK i
s Ssk Z sk
r r K p
h h K p
δ
δ
=
=
⎧ = = −⎪⎨ = =⎪⎩
∑
∑ ,        (10) 
where Kz is the number of people in a subgroup. Demand shifts are determined by taking into 
account values given in (10) where itp  and 
i
sp are given by the average market prices l tp  and l sp  
in France in 2002 (see table 5). Using both endowments (tuna and sardines) in the experiment 
(leading to 
z
Sδ  and zTδ ) is hence essential for solving equation (10). In the calibrated model, the 
aggregate responses coming from the experiment are integrated by taking into account the 
average values defined by (10). 
We now turn to the description of the calibration of a partial equilibrium model of the 
French markets for canned tuna and canned sardines. 
 
5.2 Calibration 
Parameters of the model are calibrated such as to predict prices and quantities in France 
(under the absence of information) for the year 2002 (see table 5), the most recent complete year 
when the analysis was undertaken (OFIMER, 2003). The supply and demand equations are 
 25
represented by linear approximations with the corresponding elasticity at the point of 
approximation. For the supply side, we assigned values to supply function such as 
f f f fX d e p= +  with f=t or s for tuna or sardines, with elasticities found in the literature. For the 
calibration of demands described in equation (8), we assigned values to the parameters based on 
elaticities that we estimated (see table 5).19 
The aggregation of demands of different subgroups leads to the overall demand. We 
distinguish households consuming both types of fish from those only consuming tuna 
(e.g., 0s sα β γ= = = ) or only consuming sardines (e.g., 0t tα β γ= = = ). For calibrating the 
effect of information, we also distinguish consumers “at risk” for whom 
z
tr >0 and 
z
sh >0 from 
those “not at risk” for whom 
z
tr =0 and 
z
sh =0 (not concerned by the health message of this 
experiment).  
For consumers “at risk”, namely households with women of childbearing age and/or with 
young kids under age 14, we take the average values of equation (5) over all subjects of the 
experiment (namely the one switching and the one not switching) for determining 
z
tr  and 
z
sh  
defined by (10). In this case, the average values (including also consumers who do not switch) 
are 1.28Sδ =  for groups A and B and 0.21Tδ = −  for groups C and D. We also assumed that 
only demands of consumers consuming both types of goods (demand by consumers 1Ω in table 
                                                 
19 For subgroup z and by using (8) consider the overall demand for tuna without health information (at stage j=i) as 
given by
1
( , ) zKitz t s tk tz tz t sz skX p p x a b p g p== = − +∑ . Denote observed average market prices l tp  and l sp  in 
France in 2002, annually purchased quantity of tuna by group z as l tzX , the own price elasticity  ttε  and the cross-
price elasticity  tsε  (see table 5). The calibrated parameters are  l l/tztttz tb X pε= − ,  l l/tztssz sg X pε=  and 
l l ltztz tz t sz sa X b p g p= + − . 
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5) were modified.20 
The data used for estimating elasticities are drawn from the 2002 issues of a French 
household panel conducted by SECODIP (Société d'Etude de la Consommation, Distribution et 
Publicité) on household purchases.21 90% of households consume canned tuna and 57% consume 
canned sardines. We only focused on households that are consumers of caned tuna and/or canned 
sardines. We aggregated to quarterly expenditures in order to avoid the problem of purchase 
infrequency, assuming that households having no expenditures on tuna or sardines are a non-
purchaser of that good. We eliminated the non-purchasers that buy neither tuna nor sardines. 
Observations were classified according to whether or not consumers purchase tuna and sardines 
( 1Ω ), only tuna ( 2Ω ), or only sardines ( 3Ω ). The econometric model consisted in regressing log-
quantities and log-prices and tuna (see table 5). 
The equalization of aggregate demand and supply will lead to equilibrium prices that clear 
the market. We will directly use the prices adjustments for measuring producers’ profits, 
surpluses of different consumer groups (including the cost/benefit of ignorance) and total welfare 
(see appendix C). 
                                                 
20 Alternatively, we distinguished subjects initially not interested in sardines (with k 13iSardq =  for groups A and B 
and k 1itunaq =  for groups C and D) from those initially accepting sardines, leading to results close to the ones given 
in table 6. For the subjects initially not interested by sardines, the average value (including also consumers who do 
not switch) is  2.06Sδ =  and  0.29Tδ = − .  These values would modify the demand that integrates the possibility 
to consume sardines after the revelation of information (demand by consumers 2Ω  in table 5). For subjects initially 
accepting sardines, the average value (including also consumers who do not switch) is  0.74Sδ =  and 
 0.19Tδ = − . These values would modify the demands of consumers consuming both types of goods (demand by 
consumers 1Ω  in table 5). Effects are similar to the ones that will be presented in table 6, even if monetary values 
are different since the price increase for sardines is larger than in table 6. 
21 For 2002, the initial samples contain 5362 households. This survey contains detailed information on the attributes 
of households living in France and on their purchase behaviour regarding various consumption goods, including 
numerous food products. Each issue provides, over the whole year, a description of the main characteristics of the 
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To estimate the impact of information, we divided the populations (and the overall 
demands) according to their risk status and their consumption habits. The subgroup of 
households concerned by the information includes all households with women of childbearing 
age and/or with young kids under age 14.22 From INSEE (1999), these households represent 
50.5% of French consumers. For measuring different contexts of diffusion, we will distinguish 
the case 1, where all the 50.5% of concerned households receive health information and the case 
2, where only half of these concerned consumers are reached by this information.23 We now turn 
to the results. 
 
5.3. Results  
The table 6 provides the economic impact of information on prices and surpluses of agents over 
the year 2002 (see appendix C for details about the following expressions). The first lines present 
the respective variations in the price of tuna TpΔ  and sardine SpΔ  coming from the information 
revelation. The following lines denote the variation of surpluses coming from the information 
revelation and the resulting price variation. Recall that the variations of surplus are equal to the 
surplus with information less the surplus without information. For each line, a positive value 
means a benefit coming from the information, while a negative value means a loss coming from 
the information.  
                                                                                                                                                             
goods, the purchased quantities and the corresponding expenditures. 
22 For simplicity, we considered that households without women of childbearing age or without young kids are not 
concerned by the revealed information, even if omegas 3 concern all the population for its impact on cardiovascular 
risk. 
23 An alternative assumption would consist in defining an optimal level of “advertising/promotion” with a function 
cost ( )C β  with '( ), ''( ) 0C Cβ β >  where β  is the proportion of women receiving the information. It would be 
possible to use the table 1 p. 427 in Kinnucan and Myrland (2001) for values of promotion elasticity for France. 
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In table 6, TΔΠ  and SΔΠ  respectively denote the profits variations for the tuna producers 
and the sardines producers (without any change in their capital structure). 1CSΔ  denotes the 
surplus variation for the consumers not concerned by the information, namely “not at risk” for 
whom 
1
tr =0 and 
1
th =0. 2CSΔ  denotes the surplus variation for the consumers “at risk” with 2tr >0 
and 
2
th >0 (see equation (C7) for details about case 1 and case 2). WΔ denotes the overall welfare 
variation. Eventually, we provide the surplus variation j 2CSΔ  for consumers that are concerned 
by the revealed information under the simplifying assumption that initial prices were fixed (the 
other agents’ surplus remains unchanged so that i j 2W CSΔ = Δ ). 
The demand shifts imply a fall in the equilibrium price for tuna ( 0TpΔ < ) and an increase 
in the equilibrium price for sardine ( 0SpΔ > ). Note that the price variation for sardines is larger 
than the absolute value of the price variation for tuna, since the average values of Sδ  for sardines 
are larger than the average values of Tδ  for tuna in our experiment. As consequences, gross 
profits for tuna producers fall, while gross profits for sardine producers surge. 
Despite the subsequent price changes, concerned consumers/households benefit from the 
information since 2CSΔ  is positive. Consumers not concerned by the revealed information suffer 
from the subsequent change in market prices with a negative 1CSΔ . This loss comes from the 
large price increase for sardines that outweighs the positive impact of the small price decrease 
for tuna. 
Table 6 shows a positive welfare gain to inform households or women despite some 
losses for tuna producers and for consumers not concerned by the revealed information. The net 
welfare gain WΔ  is positive for all configurations presented in table 6. In other words, the 
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benefits of information for concerned consumers and the better profits for sardines producers 
outweigh the losses for both tuna producers and consumers not concerned by the information.  
The possibility to consider stable prices after the revelation of information with a 
consumer’s surplus j 2CSΔ  would lead to an overestimation of both consumers’ surplus and 
welfare (measuring the value of information), since the ratios j 22 /CS CSΔ Δ  and j 2/W CSΔ Δ  
given in the last rows of table 6 are relatively low. The relatively large price increase for sardines 
is costly for consumers that adjust their behavior in response to information, so that the benefit of 
the information on their surplus is partially thwarted by a negative effect coming from this price 
increase for sardines. This welfare overestimation with j 22 / 1CS CSΔ Δ <  and j 2/ 1W CSΔ Δ <  was 
overlooked in the previous estimation of the value of information coming from experimental 
economics. 
The sensitivity of the results was also studied. In particular, the effects presented in table 
6 are relatively similar under alternative scenarios, even if monetary values are different. As 
table 6 shows, there is a social gain to inform women at childbearing age. However, table 6 only 
considers the efficacy of informing consumers, abstracting from the cost of information. It may 
though be reinterpreted for taking into account the overall monetary cost of information. As soon 
as the cost of information is lower than the net welfare gain ( WΔ ), a diffusion of information is 
socially desirable.  
 
6. Conclusion 
Public health communication about fish consumption is a difficult task because of the complexity of 
health risks and benefits that pose themselves in different weights for different parts of the 
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population. In order to test the ability of benefit and risk advisories to change consumer behavior, we 
present results of an economic, non-hypothetical choice experiment involving the evaluation of 
substitution rates. 
 It turns out that the experimental procedures have important implications for the evaluation of 
product substitution. We show that the order of information and consumption recommendations 
matters. Efficiency of information can be improved by first talking about benefits before talking 
about risks, as then the information about benefits is still absorbed. It seems useful to begin an 
advisory to women at childbearing age by first insisting on the benefits coming from omega-3 
polyunsaturated fatty acids, followed by a clear consumption recommendation. 
Another important finding is the value of information mixing experimental results and a 
quantitative estimate applied to the French market for forecasting prices reactions and welfare 
variations. This new methodology could be used by policy bodies for ex ante estimation of 
labeling/recommendation policies for predicting market reactions through the introductions of 
experimental results into a partial market equilibrium model. 
Of course, our results are limited to the substitution between two fish species. One extension 
should consider the introduction of more species, fully representing French consumption. Another 
extension should introduce the possibility for consumers to change their total fish consumption, since 
we voluntarily constrained their choices to a value equivalent to six cans. One way to relax the 
separability assumption of the two goods would consist in offering at the end of the experiment the 
possibility to exchange the six cans they received versus the numeraire, which would be consistent 
with Spence’s quasi-linear utility model used in equation (6) or to measure WTP for each fish using, 
e.g., the Becker, Marshak and DeGroot (1964) mechanism. Another extension could give subjects 
the choice to obtain or refuse additional information during the experiment.  
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By correcting idiosyncratic characteristics, the experiment could also be replicated in other 
countries for better understanding consumers’ reactions. It could complete studies focusing on 
women’s observed reactions to fish consumption advisories. For instance, the methodology of this 
paper could be useful for directly tackling some points of the research agenda recently raised by the 
US National Academies (National Academies, 2006). 
The experimental work on health information emphasizes that when an advisory is 
issued, it is imperative that the regulatory agency takes into account several important factors, 
such as consumers’ reaction and preferences for some fish species, before deciding the type of 
information and/or the media to use. The results of this paper point to the importance of 
developing economic analyses prior to the diffusion of an advisory regarding methylmercury.
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Table 1. Description of fish cans 
Connétable cans Grams Price per can in 
supermarket in 
2005(€) 
Price per 
kilogram (€) 
Average price in 
France in 2002 (€) 
Tuna (Albacore) 80 1.65 20.62 6.1 
Sardine 87 1.69 19.42 8.2 
Source: authors and Ofimer (2003) for the last column. 
 
 
 
Table 2. Average content in omega-3s and in methylmercury for canned tuna and canned 
sardines in Europe 
 Omega-3s (n-3 PUFA) 
in g/100g raw fish 
Methylmercury in mg/kg 
fresh matter 
Canned tuna 0.25 * 
0.5 ** 
0.210*** 
Canned sardines 3.3 * and ** 0.052 
Sources: * EFSA (2005, table 23 p.63) and ** Sidhu (2003, table 5 p. 341) for omega-3s and Crépet et al. 
(2005, table 1, pp. 181-182) for methylmercury. ***The methylmercury level for canned tuna is a lower 
bound given by scenario 3 in table 1, p. 182 in Crépet et al. (2005). 
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Table 3. Experimental design 
Information about  
Initial 
Endowment 
(Fish I) 
Omega-3 fatty acids ((1a) and (1b)) 
Methylmercury ((2a) and (2b)) 
Methylmercury ((2a) and (2b)) 
Omega-3 fatty acids ((1a) and (1b)) 
Tuna Group A 
27 women  
Group B 
31 women 
Sardines Group C 
28 women 
Group D 
29 women 
 
 
 
Table 4. Description of experimental groups 
 Group A Group B Group C Group D 
     
Number of subjects 27 31 28 29 
     
Number of subjects changing after  
omega-3 (1a) 
8 9 11 7 
Number of subjects changing after  
omega-3 recommendation (1b) 
12 3 9 4 
Number of subjects changing after  
mercury (2a) 
8 11 9 8 
Number of subjects changing after  
mercury recommendation (2b) 
8 10 8 9 
Number of subjects choosing 1 can of Fish 
II on any of the five sheets 
13/135 12/155 21/140 19/145 
Number of subjects choosing always Fish I 
on any of the five sheets 
43/135 38/155 20/140 31/145 
Number of subjects constantly choosing 
Fish I 
5 5 2 3 
Number of subjects constantly choosing 
Fish II 
0 0 3 1 
 
 
 
Table 5. Demand Specification for the households who purchase both canned Tuna and 
canned sardines in France in 2002 
Variable Description Values  
Tuna Overall consumption in France in 2002 
(in tons) 
63 845  
 Average price in 2002 (in euros) 6.1  
 Supply elasticity1 0.2  
Sardines Overall consumption in France in 2002 
(in tons) 
11 484  
 Average price in 2002 (in euros) 8.2  
 Supply elasticity1 0.2  
    Consumers  1Ω  purchasing both sardines and tuna   
 % of households consuming sardines and tuna3 65%  
 Demand elasticities2  Tuna Sardines 
 Own-price –0.58* –0.476* 
 Cross-price –0.059* 0.144* 
    Consumers  2Ω  only purchasing tuna    
 % of households consuming only tuna3 32.5%  
 Own-price elasticity of demand2 –0.534*  
    Consumers  3Ω  only purchasing sardines   
 % of households consuming only sardines3 2.5%  
 Own-price elasticity of demand2 –0.451*  
Source: OFIMER 2003, Secodip 2002 
1 Supply ealsticities by Babula and Corey (2004) for tuna in the US where “fishery [are] exploited at or near 
its maximum yields” (see p.145). By lack of credible estimation for France, we assume that technologies 
between these two countries are similar. We also assume that sardines fisheries exhibit the same 
technology. 
2 Author Estimation for the elasticity with SECODIP 2002. * marks significance at the 5% level in the 
regression between the log of quantities and the log of prices. 
3 Percentage over the overall number of consumers only purchasing tuna or sardines. 
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Table 6. Economic effects of information to prices and different groups (in euros) 
 Case 1 Case 2 
Price variations   
TpΔ  –0.28 –0.14 
l/T tp pΔ (%)  –4.6% –2.3% 
SpΔ  3.70 1.85 
l/S tp pΔ (%) 45.2% 22.6% 
   
Surplus variation when prices vary    
TΔΠ  –21 579 855 –10 832 098 
SΔΠ   54 931 214   26 503 449 
1CSΔ  –13 830 515 –12 576 828 
2CSΔ     7 609 339     8 403 685 
WΔ   27 130 183   11 498 207 
/W WΔ  (%) 2.8% 1.2% 
   
Surplus variation with constant initial prices   
j i2 ( )CS WΔ = Δ  40 196 836 20 098 418 
j 22 /CS CSΔ Δ  (%) 18.9% 41.8% 
j 2/W CSΔ Δ  (%) 67.4% 57.2% 
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Figure 1. Mean Switching-Point Quantities ( j6II IISWR q= ) 
0
0.5
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no info omega 3
(1a)
omega 3 rec
(1b)
mercury
(2a)
mercury rec
(2a)
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
no info mercury  (2a) mercury rec
(2b)
omega 3 (1a) omega 3 rec
(1b)
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
no info mercury
(2a)
mercury rec
(2b)
omega 3
(1a)
omega 3 rec
(1b)
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
no info omega 3
(1a)
omega 3 rec
(1b)
mercury
(2a)
mercury rec
(2b)
Group A                                                     Group B
Group C                                                     Group D
Δ* Δ*a Δ* Δ*
Δ* Δ*aΔ*a Δ*a b
( )SardSWR ( )SardSWR
( )TunaSWR ( )TunaSWR
2.20         1.89         1.73         1.57          1.52 1.96         1.60         1.69         1.67          1.56
0.97        1.01         1.43         1.48          1.98 0.89  1.19 1.39 1.43 1.43
Note of figure 1: Δ* denotes significant difference at 5% as tested by the Wilcoxon test for 
comparing paired sample choices jIISWR  and 
1j
IISWR
+  with j∈{i,v} for the different stages of 
information revelation. a denotes differences are no longer significant when testing after deleting 
extreme observations of qII=1 or qII=13. b denotes differences that become significant when 
testing after deleting observations of qII=1 or qII=13. On the X axis, “Omega3 rec” and “mercury 
rec” means that a recommendation were revealed to subjects (see section 3.4).
APPENDIX A 
 
The precise messages are translated from the original French. 
 
Messages linked to the omega-3 fatty acids  
 
Message (1a) for groups A and B (with the endowment of 6 cans of tuna) 
Fish is important for the diet equilibrium. Fish is a good source of proteins, vitamins, and 
minerals. Fish content is high in omega-3 fatty acids and low in saturated fat. 
Tuna contains six-fold less omega-3 fatty acids than sardines. 
 
Message (1a) for groups C and D (with the endowment of 6 cans of sardines) 
Fish is important for the diet equilibrium. Fish is a good source of proteins, vitamins, and 
minerals. Fish content is high in omega-3 fatty acids and low in saturated fat. 
Sardines contain six-fold more omega-3 fatty acids than tuna. 
 
Message (1b) for all groups  
The regular consumption of omega-3 fatty acids helps to reduce the risks of cardiovascular 
diseases and it contributes to brain development and growth of children. Public health authorities 
advise eating fish at least twice a week. 
 
 
Messages linked to the methylmercury 
 
Message (2a) for groups A and B (with the endowment of 6 cans of tuna) 
Fish contains methylmercury (organic form of mercury) naturally present in water and coming 
from industrial pollution. All fish contain traces of methylmercury. By accumulation, larger fish 
that have lived longer have the highest level of methylmercury. Tuna contains four-fold more 
methylmercury than sardines. 
 
Message (2a) for groups C and D (with the endowment of 6 cans of sardines) 
Fish contains methylmercury (organic form of mercury) naturally present in water and coming 
from industrial pollution. All fish contain traces of methylmercury. By accumulation, larger fish 
that have lived longer have the highest level of methylmercury. Sardines contain four-fold less 
methylmercury than tuna. 
 
Message (2b) for all groups 
The mercury effects on health have been shown by several medical studies. The results of these 
studies show a lack of brain development in the fetus and in children exposed to mercury. Public 
health authorities advise pregnant women, childbearing women and young children to avoid the 
consumption of predatory fish such as tuna. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
The 12 situations to select for groups A and B.  
 
Situation 1 O  6 tuna cans            or O  1 sardine can 
Situation 2 O  6 tuna cans            or O  2 sardine cans 
Situation 3 O  6 tuna cans            or O  3 sardine cans 
Situation 4 O  6 tuna cans            or O  4 sardine cans 
Situation 5 O  6 tuna cans            or O  5 sardine cans 
Situation 6 O  6 tuna cans            or O  6 sardine cans 
Situation 7 O  6 tuna cans            or O  7 sardine cans 
Situation 8 O  6 tuna cans            or O  8 sardine cans 
Situation 9 O  6 tuna cans            or O  9 sardine cans 
Situation 10 O  6 tuna cans            or O  10 sardine cans 
Situation 11 O  6 tuna cans            or O  11 sardine cans 
Situation 12 O  6 tuna cans            or O  12 sardine cans 
 
 
The 12 situations to select for groups C and D. 
 
Situation 1 O  6 sardine cans         or O  1 tuna cans 
Situation 2 O  6 sardine cans         or O  2 tuna cans 
Situation 3 O  6 sardine cans         or O  3 tuna cans 
Situation 4 O  6 sardine cans         or O  4 tuna cans 
Situation 5 O  6 sardine cans         or O  5 tuna cans 
Situation 6 O  6 sardine cans         or O  6 tuna cans 
Situation 7 O  6 sardine cans         or O  7 tuna cans 
Situation 8 O  6 sardine cans         or O  8 tuna cans 
Situation 9 O  6 sardine cans         or O  9 tuna cans 
Situation 10 O  6 sardine cans         or O  10 tuna cans 
Situation 11 O  6 sardine cans         or O  11 tuna cans 
Situation 12 O  6 sardine cans         or O  12 tuna cans 
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APPENDIX C: Definition of producers’ and consumers’ surplus  
 
 
With an overall supply f f f fX d e p= +  with f=t or s for tuna or sardines, the overall gross profit 
for an equilibrium price p is 
0
( ) ( )
p
f f f tp d ep dpΠ = +∫ . 
For a subgroup z with a demand without information (at stage j=i) given by 
( , )itz t s tz tz t sz sX p p a b p g p= − +  for tuna (see footnote 19) and ( , )isz t s sz sz s tz tX p p a b p g p= − +  for 
sardines, and observed average prices l tp  and l sp  in France in 2002 (see table 5), the consumer 
surplus (at stage j=i) is  
l
l
l
l
0 0
( , ) ( , )ti si
t s
p pi i i
z tz t s t sz t s sp p
CS X p p dp X p p dp= +∫ ∫ ,     (C1) 
where 0tip  is such that l0( , ) 0itz ti sX p p =  and 0sip  is such that ( ) 00 =si,tisz ppˆX . Following Polinsky 
and Rogerson (1983) and Teisl et al. (2001), the cost/benefit of ignorance linked to the lack of 
information and internalization is also considered in the surplus/welfare. By using (10), the 
cost/benefit of ignorance to consider is given by  
( , ) ( , )
z zi i i
t sz tz t s sz t sIG r X p p h X p p= − + .      (C2) 
The overall consumer surplus integrating the cost/benefit of ignorance is i iz zCS IG+ . 
After the complete revelation of information at stage v, the new demands are 
( , )
z zv
t ttz t s tz tz t sz s tz szX p p a b p g p b r g h= − + − −  for tuna (see equation (8) and footnote 19 for 
details) and ( , )
z zv
t tsz t s sz sz s tz t tz szX p p a b p g p g r b h= − + + + . The new equilibrium prices i vtp  and 
i v
sp  are computed via the calibrate model. The consumer surplus (at stage j=v) is  
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i
i
i
i
0 0
( , ) ( , ) ( , )tv svv v
t s
p pv vz zv v v
t sz tz t s t sz t s sp p
CS r h X p p dp X p p dp= +∫ ∫ .     (C3) 
We are now able to detail the expressions given in table 6. Using previous notations the 
price variations for tuna and sardines are respectively  
i l
i l
v
T t t
v
S s s
p p p
p p p
⎧Δ = −⎪⎨⎪Δ = −⎩
         (C4) 
The profit variations for tuna producers and sardine producers are   
i l
i l
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
v
T t t t t
v
S s s s s
p p
p p
⎧ΔΠ = Π −Π⎪⎨⎪ΔΠ = Π −Π⎩
        (C5) 
By using (C1), (C2) and (C3), the surplus variation for the consumers not concerned by the 
information, namely “not at risk” for whom 
1
tr =0 and 
1
sh =0 (leading to 1 0
iIG = , 
1 1( , ) ( , )
i v
t t s t t sX p p X p p=  and 1 1( , ) ( , )i vs t s s t sX p p X p p= ) is  
 1CSΔ = 1 1(0,0)v iCS CS−         (C6) 
The surplus variation for the consumers “at risk” is the following. For a proportion β  of 
consumers “at risk” receiving the information, the parameters 
2
tr >0 and 
2
sh >0 (with 2 0
iIG ≠ ) 
leads to overall surplus 2 2
i iCS IG+  and 2 22 ( , )v t sCS r h . For a proportion (1-β ) of consumers “at 
risk” receiving no information, the parameters 
2
tr >0 and 
2
sh >0 (with 2 0
iIG ≠ ) are not internalized 
in the demand in period v which leads to overall surplus 2 2
i iCS IG+  at period i and 
2 2(0,0)
v iCS IG+  at period v. For this group the surplus difference between both periods is 
2 2(0,0)
v iCS CS−  because of prices changes. The overall surplus variation is then  
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2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2[ ( , ) ( )] (1 )[ (0,0) ]
v i i v i
t sCS CS r h CS IG CS CSβ βΔ = − + + − − .   (C7) 
Under case 1, the proportion β  is equal to 1 while, under case 2, the proportion β  is equal to 
1/2.  
The overall welfare variation WΔ is equal to the sum of surplus variations defined by 
(C5), (C6) and (C7). 
Eventually, for a scenario with constant prices in table 6, namely for i lvt tp p=  and 
i v
sp = l sp , the variation are 1 0T S CSΔΠ = ΔΠ = Δ = , the surplus variation given by (C7) leads to 
j 2 22 2 2 2[ ( , ) ( )]v i it sCS CS r h CS IGβΔ = − +  for consumers that are concerned by the revealed 
information, since 2 2(0,0)
v iCS CS=  with constant prices. 
